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Build-A-Bear
Build-A-Bear Workshop was founded in Missouri by Maxine Clark in 1997, and the
company was designed to be “a mall-based specialty retailer where children and families could
create their own stuffed animals” (Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc., 2022c, p.5). Build-A-Bear was
a revolutionary idea in which Ms. Clark “created something that is now called ‘experiential
retail’ which has fundamentally helped to change the way we think about shopping” (Build-ABear, 2022b). She also changed the stuffed animal toy market by “delivering a consistent
approach to creating emotional connections with Guests through a unique high-touch service
model” (Build-A-Bear, 2022b). As of January 29, 2022, the company employed 1000 full-time
employees and 2700 part-time employees (Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc., 2022c, p.8). Build-ABear also employs a number of seasonal workers, but that number fluctuates based on needs.
The company has a mostly centralized organizational structure with its corporate
headquarters located in St. Louis, Missouri. It has one regional headquarter in Slough, England
(Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc., 2022c, p. 21). The retailer has 346 corporately-managed
locations, 61 third-party retail locations, and 72 internationally franchised stores (Build-A-Bear,
2020b). Consumers can find Build-A-Bear in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Mexico, Australia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and South Africa (BuildA-Bear, 2022c, pp.24-26). Every corporate-managed location is leased, but the company owns
its own warehouse and distribution center in Ohio. This warehouse ships to the majority of the
brick-and-mortar locations and fulfills all North American e-commerce orders. A third-party
warehouse in Southern California handles all of the company’s West Coast stores, and a thirdparty distributor in Shanghai, China is responsible for the fulfillment of orders in Asia.
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According to Total Retail (2019), Build-A-Bear was ranked in the top 100 publiclytraded omnichannel retailers in 2019. This offered an intriguing opportunity for research as the
company does not immediately come to mind when I think of omnichannel retailers. This
company did not exist when I was a child, so I have never understood the draw of customized
stuffed animals. Combined with a quick internet search that showed surprising information about
how the company handled the COVID-19 pandemic, I decided this company warranted further
exploration.
When retailers expand globally, they are often faced with the “important decision about
the extent to which they should standardize or adapt their retail banners” (Nath et al., 2019,
p.30). This decision has been dubbed retail banner standardization (RBS) and refers to how a
company will handle its brand; choices include “extending their domestic banner(s) to their
foreign markets, opting for regional or local banners, or some combination of these two
approaches” (Nath et al., 2019, p.30). Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages to this
model. An advantage is that RBS “may lead to superior performance because global banners can
make retailers more efficient through higher economies of scope and lower organizational
complexity” (Nath et al., 2019, p.31). However, RBS may remove the possibility of catering to a
specific country’s needs, which could hurt the financial performance of the company (Nath et al.,
2019, p.31).
Build-A-Bear seems to follow a method comparable to the RBS method. The company
has a low-complexity hierarchy with limited warehouses and headquarters. This centralized
structure allows the company to have greater control over its brand. Additionally, the corporatemanaged locations all function similarly and have a cohesive appearance. According to the
company’s 2021 Annual Report, Build-A-Bear’s third-party retail model operates by the
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company selling their products wholesale to other companies who then execute the company’s
retail experience (p.23). Build-A-Bear is able to standardize how the company sells its
merchandise by having contracts in place to ensure that third-party and franchised retailers
maintain the brand. Whether the retail location is online, a brick-and-mortar in Kuwait, or a popup location in the United States, customers will have a similar experience in each retailing
channel due to the company standardizing its operations.
Maintaining the consistency of a brand is crucial to the success of a company, as it “leads
to a strong brand equity, which means the added value brought to your company’s products or
services that allows you to charge more for your brand than what identical, unbranded products
command” (Williams, 2022). As retailers develop omnichannel capabilities, there is a risk that
selling online could hurt a company’s reputation. To combat this challenge, there are several
factors a retailer needs to consider to ensure customers are understanding a brand’s identity.
Companies need to remember every touchpoint, which includes brick-and-mortar locations,
advertising, online stores, messaging, and social media accounts (Cestrian Imaging Limited,
2020). Everything that the company releases to the market needs to align to the brand and its
values. Companies also need to think about cultural references, the translation of taglines, and
seasonal variations for different regions (Cestrian Imaging Limited, 2020). For example, while it
may be summer in the United States in July, it is winter in South Africa. For Build-A-Bear this
means that swimwear needs to be offered to one market and scarves and mittens need to be
offered to another.
Build-A-Bear is both the retailer and the brand. As such, it is able to maintain its brand,
and it does this is several different ways. The first is that the company has a single logo it uses
across all of its merchandise, packaging, signage, advertisements, stores, etc. The company also

Rotblatt 5
maintains a consistent image on its ecommerce sites. The ecommerce site for the United States
has a similar look to its ecommerce site for the United Arab Emirates with minor changes in
keeping with the regions, such as different currency listed on prices (Build-A-Bear Workshop,
Inc. 2022; Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc., 2016). The company also maintains its brand by
offering products that are appropriate for different regions. For example, the retailer offers
country specific clothing for the stuffed animals, such as a Team England football (soccer) jersey
versus a variety of Australian National Rugby League team jerseys (Build-A-Bear Workshop,
Inc., 2016; Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc., 2022a). The company’s ability to preserve its brand
will help it provide a consistent message to customers as it begins to adapt the new technology
required for Industry 4.0.
The fourth industrial revolution emerged in the 2010s as an advanced version of the third
revolution. It is more technologically advanced and “is characterized by a fusion of technologies
that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres” (Schwab, 2016).
When retailers join this revolution, they will need to offer a fully integrated and immersive
shopping experience for customers that has a heavy emphasis on new technology. Build-ABear’s response to the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the company’s ability
to transition from omnichannel retailing to the fourth industrial revolution.
In March 2020, Build-A-Bear had to temporarily close all of its UK, Ireland, and Canada
stores due to governmental regulations relating to the pandemic. The US stores followed suit in
April. As a result, the company needed to create a plan to stay in business. In four weeks, “BuildA-Bear turned its store locations into micro-fulfillment centers so it could maintain store
operations, keep associates working and create a bright spot for consumers navigating
uncertainty and stress” (Crouch, 2022). The company originally used only five of its global

Rotblatt 6
stores as test subjects, but within the month, all of its 400 locations were being used to fulfill
online orders. The company also improved its ecommerce bear building experience in an effort
to “simulate the in-store experience, allowing shoppers to pick their new stuffed animal, add
scents & sounds, dress them, and make a special wish on the heart” (Grill-Goodman, 2020).
Build-A-Bear also launched other experiences during the pandemic to help keep
customers engaged, despite not being able to shop in store. The company created “Workshop
Wednesdays, offering entertainment and other activities to inspire play, creativity and connection
while at home” (Grill-Goodman, 2020). Every Wednesday, the company offered activities
including easy-to-make snacks, DIY-crafting, coloring sheets, and more that consumers could
participate in. Additionally, customers could upload their creations to Build-A-Bear social media
for the chance to be featured.
Build-A-Bear’s quick response to the pandemic helped the company keep its doors open
long term and kept customers engaged with the brand. It improved its omnichannel experience
for consumers and showed that it was capable of pivoting to stay in business. For these reasons,
Build-A-Bear appears to be prepared for Industry 4.0. With new technology comes the need to
adapt quickly. Build-A-Bear has shown it can adapt its business to the demands of the day, as
well as institute new technology and processes easily.
There is never a guarantee that a retailer will survive in the future, but there are financial
factors that can determine the current health of a company, which could speak to the likelihood
of a company’s long-term viability. These factors are the financial ratios associated with
liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Liquidity is the amount of cash on-hand and assets that can
be easily converted to cash a company has to pay off immediate debts. The ratios used are the
current ratio and the quick ratio. Solvency is “a company's ability to meet its debt obligations on
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an ongoing basis, not just over the short term” (Maverick, 2022). The ratio used is the debt-toequity ratio. Profitability is determined through the company’s profit margin and is “the best
single indicator of its financial health and long-term viability” (Maverick, 2022).
Liquidity ratios speak to a company’s ability to survive in the short term by paying off its
immediate debts with available cash or easily-converted-to-cash assets. The quick ratio excludes
inventory as it is often difficult for companies to sell inventory quickly. Build-A-Bear’s quick
ratio was .46 for 2019, .44 for 2020, and .46 for 2021 (see Appendix). These numbers are
concerning as “a quick ratio lower than 1.0 is often a warning sign, as it indicates current
liabilities exceed current assets” (Maverick, 2022). It is important to evaluate a company’s quick
ratio against the current ratio, as the current ratio takes into account inventory levels.
Build-A-Bear’s current ratio was 1.15 for 2019, 1.12 for 2020, and 1.33 for 2021 (see
Appendix). A current ratio above 1.0 means that a company has sufficient assets to cover its
liabilities. According to the ratios, Build-A-Bear may not have sufficient current assets to cover
its short term liabilities without inventory, but if inventory is calculated into the equation, as
done for the current ratio, the company is less risky to investors. This is not enough information
to determine a company’s viability in the future, so solvency and profitability need to be
examined as well.
Solvency is one way to calculate the health of a company because “it demonstrates a
company’s ability to manage operations into the foreseeable future” (Hayes, 2020). It compares a
company’s total liabilities to its total equity to determine how much of the company’s debt is
being financed through its operations (Fernando, 2022). Generally, a retailer will want to have a
low debt-to-equity ratio, but Build-a-Bear’s ratio was 2.35 for 2019, 2.56 for 2020, and 2.07 for
2021 (see Appendix). According to the 2021 Annual Report (p. 42), Build-A-Bear’s liabilities
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increased from 2020 to 2021 due to an increase in accrued expenses and accounts payable. It is
possible that creditors extended due dates during 2020 to allow the company to stay in business
during the peak of the COVID-19 crisis. The company’s ratio has decreased from 2021 to 2020,
which is a positive sign.
Profit margin, also known as net margin, represents how much of a company’s sales has
been turned into profits and “a larger net margin, especially compared to industry peers, means a
greater margin of financial safety, and also indicates a company is in a better financial position to
commit capital to growth and expansion” (Segal, 2021; Maverick, 2022). Build-A-Bear’s profit
margin was .1% in 2019, -9% in 2020, and 11.5% in 2021 (see Appendix). The company has
struggled over the past few years, with its lowest profit margin in 2020. The profit margin in
2020 was a direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the global requirement to temporarily
close all brick-and-mortar locations (Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc., 2021). However, the
company rebounded due to its ability to quickly improve its omnichannel experience which
allowed customers to shop online and continue to engage in the merchandise.
Build-A-Bear is a 25 year old company that specializes in the experience on building a
stuffed animal. The company is a global omnichannel retailer with brick-and-mortar locations
around the world. The company follows a method similar to Retail Banner Standardization in
which all of its locations operate under the single brand. The company maintains its brand
through its logo, and customers will have the same experience whether they are in the United
States or Bahrain. Based on its improving debt-to-equity ratio and profit margin for 2021, and its
ability to adapt quickly when necessary, the company has positioned itself correctly to survive in
the long term and transition to Industry 4.0.
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Appendix
(2018 and 2019 come from 2019 Annual Report; 2020 and 2021 come from 2021 Annual Report)

Quick ratio (in thousands)

2018

2019

2020

2021

Cash

$

19,555

$

28,395

$

34,840

$

32,845

Accounts receivable

$

10,588

$

11,526

$

8,295

$

8,295

$

97,382

$

89,328

Current Liabilities

$

Current ratio (in thousands)

56,177

$

85,964

0.54

0.46

0.44

0.46

2018

2019

2020

2021

Current Assets

$

99,798

$

98,750

$

100,193

$

129,998

Current Liabilities

$

56,177

$

85,964

$

89,328

$

97,382

Solvency (in thousands)

1.78

1.15

1.12

1.33

2018

2019

2020

2021

Total Liabilities

$

77,732

$

208,631

$

172,641

$

194,064

Total Shareholder Equity

$

94,314

$

88,631

$

67,308

$

93,683

Debt-to-Equity Ratio

0.82

2.35

2.56

2.07

Profit Margin (in
thousands)

2018

2019

2020

2021

Net income

$

(17,933)

$

261

$

(22,983)

$

47,265

Revenue

$

336,585

$

338,543

$

255,310

$

411,522

-5.3%

0.1%

-9.0%

11.5%

